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ABSTRACT
JOSIAH SAMUEL MEZERA: External Support in Civil Wars and its Effects on Refugee
Flow
(Under the direction of Benjamin T. Jones)
The refugee crisis in Syria that began in 2011 raised several questions in terms of
civil war interventions and their effects on refugee flow. Did a third party’s decision to
intervene in the Syrian Civil War have any impact on the flow of refugees from the
region? This thesis attempts to answer this question. There are multiple forms that
external support by a third party can assume: direct military support, indirect military
support, and humanitarian aid. This thesis hypothesized that direct and indirect military
support would correlate with an increased number of refugees, and that humanitarian aid
would have little to no correlation. This thesis used data from Patrick M. Regan’s article
“Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts” (2002) to construct
each of those broad categories of external support by combining relevant variables into a
single measure. These categories were then tested using R against refugee data pulled
from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. While regression tests
supported the second hypothesis by showing little to no correlation between humanitarian
aid and refugee flow, direct and indirect military support also exhibited little to no
relationship with refugee flow. Tests at the constituent variable-level, however, did reveal
that external support in the form of troops or military equipment were correlated with
increased numbers of refugees, opening the door for further research with respect to these
types of interventions.
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Introduction
In 2013, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees recorded 1.3
million Syrian refugees throughout the world. The so-called Syrian Refugee Crisis was a
direct result of the ongoing Syrian Civil War, which featured at least four different
competing factions. This civil war brought about interventions by regional and
international actors, each with their own policy incentives for supporting a particular
faction. What impact did these interventions have on the level of refugee flow from Syria?
The objective of this research is to determine the impact of external support in
civil wars on the level of refugee flow. Competing factions often receive a wide variety
of external support, ranging from direct military support to humanitarian aid. While
contemporary research has analyzed the relationship between intrastate conflict and
refugee flow, there exists almost no research on the relationship between refugee flow
and different types of external support. This thesis hopes to establish strong connections
between different types of external support and the flow of refugees from a country
undergoing a civil war. By understanding how different types of support for a faction in a
civil war can impact the overall regional stability, states can better assess the costs and
benefits of getting involved with that secessionist conflict. If one of the known impacts of
a certain type of external support was an increased rate of refugee flow, countries may
reconsider their strategies for intervention. Some states would find this information more
useful than others, including those in conflict-hot regions like the Middle East, South
America, and Africa. International actors like the United States, Russia, the EU, UN, and
NGO groups could apply this information to their foreign policy strategies and seek a
more effective means of intervening in a civil war.
1

In this thesis, I will elaborate on the theoretical definition of refugee flow, as well
possible explanations for why some forms of external support are more likely to produce
refugees than others. I hypothesize that indirect and direct forms of military support will
correspond to a higher level of refugee flow, and that humanitarian aid will have no effect.
First, I will review the literature on interventions in civil wars and theories related to
refugee flow. I follow this with a theoretical argument describing the process by which
external support can affect refugee flow in civil wars. Next, I will conduct multiple
regression tests on broadly categorized forms of external support, as well as their
constituent variables. Lastly, I discuss the results of my analysis and make suggestions in
terms of policy applications and future research. In general, my results find little to no
correlation between my broadly defined categories of indirect and direct military support
and refugee flow, although humanitarian aid was correctly predicted to have little to no
effect. At the constituent variable level, however, interventions in the form of troops or
military equipment were shown to have a positive effect on the number of refugees.
Literature Review
The relationship between civil wars and civilian victimization is essential to the
understanding of refugee flow. Idean Salehyan and Kristian Gleditsch observed that
certain regions of the world experience conflict more than others, and that the movements
of displaced peoples (namely refugees) is a major source of that conflict (Salehyan &
Gleditsch, 2006). This observation establishes the importance of understanding why these
regions experience more refugee flows. Davenport, Moore, and Poe attempt to answer
this question in their article (2003). What they found is that through measuring state
threats to personal integrity, dissident threats to personal integrity, and joint state2

dissident threats they could predict which countries would experience higher levels of
refugee migrants. In other words, countries where the state actively threatens its people
often experience higher levels of exiting refugees. Claire Apodaca postulates this theory
in her article (1998). While Davenport et al. measured state threats as an indicator of
higher refugee flow, Apodaca looks specifically at human rights abuses. She finds that
states with higher levels of human rights abuses tend to have higher levels of refugee
flow. This is an important point for determining the overall theory behind why certain
types of support could lead to higher levels of refugees. Support that increases the threatmaking abilities of the state or rebels could lead to higher levels of refugees, whereas
support that does not increase their threat-making abilities will have little to no impact.
And while it may not be in relation to civil wars specifically, researcher Alexander
Downes analyzes the logic behind civilian victimization in interstate wars (2006).
According to Downes, longer conflicts, typically those with an attrition aspect, usually
see higher levels of victimization. States adopt this strategy for a few reasons: to coerce
their adversary to quit, to reduce their losses, and to eliminate the possibility of a future
rebellion. Overall, these works illustrate the positive relationship between intrastate
conflicts and civilian victimization.
Kalyvas asserts that there is a definitive logic to civilian victimization,
specifically in civil wars (2006). Unlike studies on interventions, however, Kalyvas
suggests that violence against civilians is the result of preexisting internal issues between
different citizen groups. Wood, Kathman, and Gent argue that violence against
noncombatants can vary in response to a direct military intervention by a third party
(2012). Their study found that an external intervention results in a decreased amount of
3

civilian victimization on the side receiving the external support, whereas violence
increases for the side in opposition. This is true whether the intervention is on the side of
the rebels or government. Their study confirms Kalyvas’ theory that civilian violence is
an intentionally implemented strategy. What these viewpoints suggest is that regardless
of the scale, style, or dimensions of a civil war, civilian victimization will always be an
element of the competing forces’ strategy. It is the implementation of this strategy that
leads to refugee flow.
One researcher, Myron Weiner, examined the origin of refugees since the end of
World War II (1996). He first identified four refugee-generating problems in intrastate
conflicts: reckless violence against non-combatants, ethnic divisions, non-ethnic divisions,
and repressive regimes. The common denominator in these problems was violent acts
committed against civilians, reaffirming the conclusions reached by Apodaca (1998). If
an intrastate conflict escalates into warfare, the levels of violence will increase and that
violence will generate actions against non-combatants. Non-combatants then become
refugees. E.F. Kunz describes refugee flow as a push-pull kinetic model (1973). In other
words, individuals flee a country owing to a combination of push factors within their
country of origin, and pull factors within the country they flee to. Additionally, Kunz
asserts that refugees conform to one of two types of kinetic flight patterns which he calls
anticipatory and acute refugee movement. Anticipatory refugee movement refers to flight
in which an individual leaves their home country before deteriorating military and
political events prevent their orderly departure. Acute refugee movement refers to flight in
response to an immediate danger or military/political threat. Kunz further distinguishes
these two patterns by their rates of flow. Acute flights tend to occur in large numbers,
4

whereas anticipatory flights are steady rates. This supports the arguments of Kalyvas
(2006) and Wood, et al. (2012), in that civilian victimization is eventually employed in a
civil war at varying degrees. As the degrees of violence change, so too do the refugee
flight patterns of civilians. The variation in refugee flow is therefore a direct result of
external actors’ intervention strategies, according to Wood, Kathman, and Gent. For this
reason, it is important to understand the logic of external support in a civil war.
How external support figures in to these relationships is clear. Salehyan,
Gleditsch, and Cunningham analyzed the logic behind external support for insurgent
groups (2011). What they found is that external governments are more likely to support
an insurgent group when that group is moderately strong and more likely to accept that
support, in the presence of transnational constituencies, international rivalries, and when
the government receives foreign support. They look at support from a supply and demand
perspective, wherein external governments must have a reason to supply their support to
insurgent groups and those insurgent groups in turn must have a demand in order to
accept that support. Rebel groups that are very strong or very weak are less likely to
receive external support. Transnational linkages and interstate rivalries are key sources of
support for rebel groups, especially in cases where the government forces receive support
from an external actor. In fact, excluding interventions by world powers, Salehyan,
Gleditsch, and Cunningham find that almost all external support for a rebel group comes
from transnational constituencies and/or rival states. This fact is very important in order
to understand how to analyze external support. While he might not have elaborated on
refugees, researcher Patrick Regan also provides valuable insight on how interventions
effect civil wars (2002). Essentially, his research confirms that interventions are a form of
5

policy implementation by third parties, and that they are deployed intentionally with
specific expectations. The chief expectation of interventions by third parties tends to be
that they will reduce conflict duration. What he found, however, is that interventions
actually extend conflict durations. This conclusion can provide an empirical explanation
for why interventions may lead to increased amounts of refugees if one considers the
increased opportunities for violence provided by the extended duration. This relationship
is theoretical, however, and Regan does not discuss issues relating to civilian
victimization or refugees in his article.
Theory
Why do people become refugees?
It is important to break down the key factors that drive individuals to become
refugees in order to understand how external support can influence that phenomenon.
When it comes to the relationship between external support for a rebel movement and
refugee flow, the underlying issue is violence. Violence, as previous literature has noted
(Apodaca, Balcells & Kalyvas, Davenport et al., Salehyan & Gleditsch), is the leading
indicator that a conflict will produce refugees. The more violent the conflict, the more
refugees it will produce (Kalyvas, 2006). This violence can take multiple forms:
conventional battlefield casualties, terrorism, genocide, ethnic conflict, state police
brutality, rioting, and famine/resource denial.
In most intrastate conflicts, violence and refugee flow are both tied to the issue of
ethnic conflict. Weiner remarks how both secessionist wars and attacks against minorities
account for a large number of refugees (Weiner, 1996). Many of these conflicts begin
when a minority within a country experiences persecution from the ethnic majority. The
6

response by these minorities is to either fight or flee. Fleeing minorities account for the
early waves of refugees in intrastate conflicts. The subsequent fighting between the
secessionist/rebel movement and the government leads to prolonged violence, and this
violence induces even more waves of refugee flow. Weiner also remarks how non-ethnic
civil wars account for a large flow of refugees (1996). There are two theoretical reasons
these conflicts produce refugees: lack of central control, and/or active government
persecution. When the state becomes incapable of protecting its citizens (especially
minorities) against violence, those citizens often choose to flee. Citizens also choose to
flee when they are being victimized. Balcells and Kalyvas found that different styles of
civil wars lead to different levels of civilian victimization (2014). Specifically, they found
that what they define as “irregular wars,” or wars fought in a guerilla fashion between
conventional government forces and lightly armed rebels, are correlated with higher
levels of civilian victimization. This confirmed their hypothesis that irregular civil wars
are the “dirtiest” in that civilians are often targeted and their livelihoods severely
impacted by the state. The state may choose to target civilians if it believes that they are
supplying the rebels with resources, recruits, or intelligence. This relationship between
irregular conflicts and civilian victimization also confirmed the general theories
expressed by Kalyvas in his earlier work (2006). Using the case of the Greek Civil War
as micro-level evidence, he found that when civilians are targeted, it is often by local
actors and center-based political elites, and oftentimes their targets are intimates or peers.
These same center-based elites try to draw lines along identities and preferences, and
these lines only develop into further violence and targeting.
A key factor in these situations is the degree of control the state and rebel factions
7

have in a particular territory. Civilians are sometimes targeted because a combatant wants
information, and Kalyvas finds that this type of targeting counterintuitively occurs less
often in hotly contested regions. This could be illustrative of the state’s paranoia of the
spread of the rebel movement and the rebel movement’s determination to maintain
control over captured territory. These paranoia-based attacks lead to further incentives for
civilians to flee the country. Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay also monitor the
relationship between wars and civilian victimization (2004). They analyzed the incidence
of mass killings since 1945 in a data set that included 147 different wars. What they
found is that civilian mass killing is often employed as a calculated military strategy used
by regimes to defeat guerilla forces in an asymmetric conflict. This fact supports the
arguments of Kalyvas. Their logic is as follows: regimes facing a large insurgency threat
from guerilla groups have few means of defeating that group head-on. Such attempts
often prove fruitless and costly to the regime. Regimes can often identify the civilian
support bases of that guerilla group, however, and by attacking said civilian support base
they can indirectly harm the efforts of the guerilla group. The regime has little incentive
to do this in a conflict where the opposing forces attack in conventional ways. This
strategy is only helpful to the regime when it is against a much weaker guerilla group.
As discussed, there are several reasons why citizens choose to become refugees.
Most cases of refugee flow manifest due to violence against civilians by either the state
or rebel movement. Those two origins of violence are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Rebel violence against civilians can occur simultaneously with state violence against
civilians. The key motivations for both groups to commit that violence are not too
dissimilar either. In a country with salient ethnic divisions, minorities choose to flee
8

when they are being targeted by the majority. The minorities that fight will usually target
the majority group in response. People from the targeted majority in regions controlled by
the minority then choose to flee. In non-ethnic intrastate conflicts, civilians flee when
they are victimized. Both the state and the rebel movements have reasons for
intentionally targeting civilians. The state may target civilians when the rebel movement
uses guerilla tactics and blends in with the civilian population. Victimization here is a
means of limiting rebel support bases. Rebels may also target civilians in order to raise
the costs of war and push the state government negotiate a settlement. In all of these
cases, civilians are experiencing the violence directly. External support can operate in
each of these cases in such a way that violence is affected.

Indirect Military Support
External support is only relevant to the issue of refugee flow if it ties back in to
one of those forms of violence. This is possible if one considers the enabling ability of
support. Some forms of support enable the rebel movement to carry out forms of violence
more than others. The findings of researchers like Kalyvas and Valentino, et al., suggest
that instances of civilian targeting and victimization are most common in asymmetric
conflicts. While they acknowledge instances of victimization in conventional wars, there
is a much higher likelihood of violence against civilians in conflicts where the rebel
movement is much smaller than the state military. External support can enable rebel
movements to conduct attacks against the government without pushing the conflict into a
more conventional-style war. Specifically, indirect support in the form of weapons,
training, money, and intelligence enables the rebel movement to carry out attacks against
9

the government, thus becoming more threatening without embroiling the country in a
full-scale, conventional war. Likewise, the more threatening the rebel movement is the
more likely the state government is to respond, sometimes in the form of civilian
victimization as Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay (2004) point out. Indirect military
support can provide the necessary resources that a rebel movement needs in order to carry
out more effective attacks against the government.
The Viet Cong, for example, relied more on demonstrations and small-scale
bombings to achieve their political goals prior to their sponsorship by the North
Vietnamese government (The Pentagon Papers, 1971). Violence escalated drastically
after North Vietnam began supplying the Viet Cong weapons and resources in earnest.
One scholar found that the number of clashes between the Viet Cong and the South
Vietnamese government increased from 180 in January of 1960 to 545 in September that
same year (Kelly, 1973). This indicates that the Viet Cong were more enabled to carry
out attacks against the government when they enough support in the form of resources.
The indirect nature of the support, however, meant that the Viet Cong could only pursue
guerilla tactics as a means of fighting the state. They lacked the heavy weaponry
necessary to fight the state on a conventional front. Their strategy involved blending in
with local populations and generating support among rural civilians. Because of this
strategy, state and US forces notoriously targeted and victimized civilian villages who
they believed to be in league with the Viet Cong. Similarly, to dissuade cooperation with
the state and US as well as increase the overall cost of war, the Viet Cong targeted
civilian villages found supporting the government. The violence and political
ramifications resulting from the decade-long conflict between the Viet Cong and South
10

Vietnamese government resulted in hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing to nearby
regions in what was called the Indochina refugee crisis (Thompson, 2010). While there
were multiple factors leading up to the refugee crisis at its apex, the success and violence
of the Viet Cong were catalysts to the shifting trend of violence, genocide, and political
instability in the region. That success and violence would have been less likely to occur
had the Viet Cong not received indirect military support from the North Vietnamese
government.

Exodus from Indochina, 1975-95

Figure 1Figure courtesy of the UNHCR Flight from Indochina Report, 2000
https://www.unhcr.org/3ebf9bad0.pdf

Further evidence of indirect support correlating with increased violence against
civilians exists in the case of the Syrian Civil War. During the Arab Spring of 2011,
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massive protests against the Ba’athist government of Syrian under Assad led to clashes
between citizens and government security forces. These clashes gradually became more
common, but largescale violence did not begin until defectors from the Syrian Army
formed the Free Syrian Army (FSA) under the auspices of Turkey (Stack, 2011).
Turkey’s further provision of training, intelligence, weapons, and transportation allowed
the FSA to grow and carry out largescale attacks on government-held cities and towns.
Early on, before the conflict took on a more conventional nature, the Syrian government
could not easily distinguish between cities and towns loyal to the state and those that
defected to the FSA. Because of this, the government conducted several indiscriminate
attacks on areas suspected of supporting the rebels. Several international organizations
even accused the Assad regime of using chemical weapons which killed hundreds of
civilians. By 2012, the US, UK, Kuwait, Sierra Leone, France, Germany, Jordan, and
Saudi Arabia were all indirectly supporting the FSA in their war against the Syrian
government.

Syrian Refugees in Neighboring Countries, 2018

12

Figure courtesy of the UNHCR Syrian Response Summary 2019-2020
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/67370

This pronounced increase in external support corresponds to an increased amount
of refugee flow. This is no coincidence. The increased international attention and support
for the rebel movements severely endangered the Assad regime’s influence and
legitimacy. In response, the Assad regime became increasingly more violent toward
civilians in an effort to dissuade support for any of the rebel movements. By 2013, an
estimated 1.5 million people had fled Syria (Taheri, 2013). Further interventions over the
course of the next 3 years showed similar trends. The more external support given to the
FSA and other rebel groups in Syria, the more violent the conflict has become. Over 6
million Syrians fled the country by 2018, due in large part to the unceasing and
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widespread violence (UNHCR, 2018). This case and that of the Viet Cong are both
compelling evidence of the phenomenon whereby external military support for a rebel
movement leads to increased violence in the form of civilian victimization, and that
violence by extension leads to increased refugee flow.

Direct Military Support
It is important to distinguish between indirect and direct military support,
however. This can be done by comparing the rates of refugee flow for distinct periods of
time. In the previously cited cases of Vietnam and Syria, for example, there are specific
years where only indirect support is given to the rebel movement, and there are generally
accepted years where that support become direct. It is possible to compare the rates of
refugee flow for those separate periods. The problem with this, however, is that indirect
support does not cease once direct support begins. Nevertheless, the nature of the conflict
very clearly changes, shifting toward a more conventional style as opposing forces
prioritize military targets over civilian ones.
The expectation is that the rate of refugee flow will be higher during periods of
direct military support than in years without any support. There are several reasons for
this expectation. Again, the root cause of refugee flow is violence. Indirect and direct
military support for a rebel movement increases that movement’s strategic capabilities,
and they are then able to conduct larger and more costly attacks on the state, shifting the
conflict toward a more conventional style of warfare. When the conflict becomes more
conventional, rebel movements typically begin to consolidate territory and establish clear,
direct control over the civilians of that territory. In both ethnic and non-ethnic related
14

conflicts this can lead to persecution against groups unaffiliated with the rebel movement.
This persecution incentivizes civilians to flee, and it leads to refugee flow if those
civilians are unable to reach areas within their own country where they are the ethnic
majority. This trend continues as long as the rebel movement has the necessary resources
to continue fighting a conventional war and consolidate their territory.
One can distinguish between indirect and direct support by comparing the nature
of the conflict before and after direct involvement. In Syria, for example, the United
States did not directly support the rebel movements there until 2014. In the years prior,
the extent of US support was indirect in forms of training, funding, weapons, and
intelligence. After 2014, however, the US began conducting airstrikes and bombardments
of ISIL-held territories (Cooper & Schmitt, 2014). These airstrikes, while notorious for
their indiscretion (Tran, 2015), allowed Kurdish and FSA rebel groups to consolidate
their territory without the added threat of organized ISIS mobilizations against their
territories. This conflict then quickly changed from a guerilla/asymmetric war to a more
conventional war drawn along political, religious, and ethnic lines. Between 2014 and
2018 the number of Syrian refugees almost doubled, even after an unprecedented 3
million people had already fled the country in the years prior (UNHCR). Many of these
refugees fled because of persecution by a group whose political, religious, or ethnic
identity they did not affiliate with. This indicates that direct military support often
changes the nature of the conflict from an asymmetric/guerrilla conflict to a more
conventional style of warfare. When this happens, both the state and rebel movement
draw battle lines and consolidate territory. Groups unaffiliated with whoever is in power
in that territory are often persecuted and incentivized to flee.
15

Further evidence of the distinct impact of direct military support can be found in
the case of Kosovo. Kosovo underwent a conflict in 1998 which saw a majority-Albanian
rebel movement called the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) fought against the
Yugoslavian government (FRY). The early stages of the conflict followed a similar
pattern to the cases of Syria and Vietnam. The KLA, while small at its beginning,
garnered support from external actors like Albania (Bacevich & Cohen, 2001). Upon
receiving this support, the KLA conducted more aggressive and violent attacks against
Yugoslavian forces. The subsequent response by the FRY increased the levels of violence
in the region, and ethnic targeting by the government resulted in hundreds of thousands
of ethnic Albanians fleeing into nearby countries as refugees as territory became more
consolidated between the two sides (UNHCR). Another shift in the dynamic of the
conflict occurred when NATO forces got involved and directly supported the KLA rebels
with airstrikes and the strategic insertion of peacekeeping forces. This shifted the trends
of the region, whereby ethnic Serbs started to flee the region as refugees in fear of
Albanian retaliation and persecution.

Areas of Control in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, April 1995
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The relationship between refugee flow and direct military support is complex.

Figure 2 Figure courtesy of the UNHCR War and Humanitarian Action Report 2000
https://www.unhcr.org/3ebf9bb50.pdf

When an external actor becomes directly involved in an intrastate conflict, it often
changes the nature of the conflict and the style of the warfare. If the conflict was
asymmetric and the rebels used guerilla tactics to combat the state, then the rebels would
have been less likely to consolidate territory. Thus, most refugees at this stage were likely
victimized by the state or rebel forces as previously mentioned with indirect military
support. Once another actor becomes directly involved in the conflict, however, the style
of warfare often changes to become more conventional. At this stage, the rebel movement
can begin consolidating territory without the fear of being overwhelmed by the state’s
17

forces. If this conflict was ethnic in nature, or lines were drawn along religious, cultural,
or political affiliations, then groups within that consolidated territory not affiliated with
the rebel identity typically face increased levels of persecution. Thus, their incentives to
flee as refugees increase.

Humanitarian Aid
Humanitarian aid, by contrast, should not have this effect. The expectation with
humanitarian aid is that at the very least it has no impact the rate of refugee flow. It is
unreasonable to assume that a humanitarian intervention will result in a negative refugee
flow rate. That is, humanitarian aid delivered to a country undergoing a civil war of some
sort is unlikely to bring refugees back into their country of origin. This is unlikely for
several reasons. Wood and Sullivan found that aid can actually increase incentives for
violence in some cases (2015). They argue that aid encourages looting and predation on
the part of the rebel organization. This behavior naturally leads to violence against
noncombatants, such as resource denial. Furthermore, Wood and Sullivan argue that aid
presents a challenge to rebel authority. Rebel groups rely heavily on the support of local
populations, and aid can decrease civilian dependence on that rebel group for resources,
order, and protection. What is interesting to note from their study is that these negative
effects of humanitarian aid mostly apply to the rebel organization. Additionally, these
effects are much more likely if the external actor delivering the aid is closely tied to the
state’s government. The state government might increase its level of violence against
civilians if it sufficiently believes the threat of rebel insurgency within the aid site is
likely. State forces are more reluctant than rebel groups to violently exploit civilians near
18

aid sites due to attention from international actors tied to those sites, as well as the threat
of losing said aid if the state does not comply with the donors’ standards of conduct.
Nevertheless, this violence should not be as pronounced as violence enabled due to
military support. Dreher, Fuchs, and Langlotz did a systematic study on foreign aid and
refugee inflows/outflows within both donor and recipient countries (2018). Their results
measured over the period between 1973 and 2013 show no robust effect of total aid
inflows to a country on total refugee outflows in the short term. They only found
evidence of decreased refugee outflows in periods longer than 10 years, but they
associated this decrease with the lagged effects of aid on economic and population
growth. They also believe that any increase in refugee inflows to donor countries are
primarily driven by perceptions and that those countries experience an improved image
for a short time. Overall, they found that their results indicate that the short-term effects
of limiting refugee flow are marginal at best.

Hypotheses
These cases present multiple hypotheses dealing with external support in three
main forms: indirect military support, direct military support, and humanitarian aid.
Hypothesis 1: Indirect and direct military support will correlate with increased
levels of refugee flow.
Hypothesis 2: Humanitarian aid will have little to no correlation with refugee
flow.
These hypotheses should challenge external state justifications for intervention that claim
they are seeking to limit the spread of refugees. Given that states have policy goals, and
19

that these goals can be achieved through interventions, states may choose to reevaluate
their cost-benefit analysis for intervention if the added costs of refugee flow are
considered. This is true for indirect military support, direct military support, and
humanitarian aid.

Definitions
For the sake of this thesis, external support can exist in one of three ways: indirect
military support, direct military support, and humanitarian aid. Indirect military support
refers to any military support that does not involve direct military confrontations with the
state. This could include intelligence, training, and the supply of weapons and equipment.
Direct military support refers to any direct military confrontations with the state. This
could manifest in the forms of strategic bombing, conventional military intervention
(boots on the ground), and sabotage or raids directed at the state’s military infrastructure.
Humanitarian aid refers to any support intended to bring relief to victims of a disaster.
For the purpose of this research, humanitarian aid would be any logistical or material
assistance delivered to noncombatants of a country undergoing an internal conflict. The
aid must be administered within the country undergoing the conflict. Categorically, the
effects of direct and indirect military support are expected to have similar impacts on
refugee flow while the effects of humanitarian aid should have a little to no impact. This
should be expected due to the normative understanding of military support versus
humanitarian aid in terms of enabling violence, with military support for combatants in
both its direct and indirect forms being much more enabling than the provision of
humanitarian aid for noncombatants.
20

Rebel movements refer to any insurgency or belligerency within a particular
country. Insurgencies are conflicts between a rebel group and the state in which the rebel
movement does not have belligerent status as defined by Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
Belligerencies, by comparison, do have belligerent status. For this paper, the difference
between the two terms is irrelevant. A rebel organization is pertinent to this research if it
is in conflict with the state government and it is receiving external support. While wars
between sovereign states also produce refugees, the political dynamic in question is quite
different. States lend support to rebel organizations for similar reasons that they would to
a sovereign state, but they assume a higher risk by supporting the less-established rebel
movement. The cost-benefit analysis of intervention is therefore different with rebel
movements, and warrants its own research. Since the risk for intervention is already
higher for external actors, the added understanding of how their support affects refugee
flow may impact their likelihood to intervene.
Refugee flow is the measurement of the phenomenon when people "owing to a
well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of
a particular social group or political opinions, [are] outside the country of [their]
nationality and [are] unable or, owing to such fear, [are] unwilling to avail [themselves]
of the protection of that country” (1951 Refugee Convention). What this definition does
not include is internally displaced peoples. While it is likely that external support for a
rebel movement can have a profound impact on the number of internally displaced
peoples in a country, this research paper is only concerned with the number of people
who flee the country entirely. This is both for the sake of interest in that particular
phenomenon and for statistical clarity. Including internally displaced peoples in the
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statistical analysis would add several complications, the first being that the measurement
of humanitarian aid would be largely irrelevant. This paper is interested in the
measurement of humanitarian aid within a country due to its expected effect of limited
impact on the flow of refugees. Humanitarian aid centers within a country tend to attract
internally displaced peoples, possibly even inflating those values by giving
noncombatants a safe haven and further incentive to abandon their homes. This paper is
only concerned with individuals who flee the country entirely due to that phenomenon’s
direct impact on regional activity.

Research Design
My purpose in this research is to understand the connection between external
support for a rebel movement during a civil war and refugee flow. As there is already a
vast array of data collected on civil wars and interventions, this simplifies the issue of
data collection. Patrick M. Regan’s data in his article “Third-Party Interventions and the
Duration of Intrastate Conflicts” (2002) provides the most thorough and relevant set of
variables to test my hypotheses. Regan recorded data on civil conflicts between the years
1945 and 1999 along with any interventions associated with those conflicts. His
parameters for defining a civil war were less restrictive than other sources, requiring only
200 fatalities to qualify as a civil war. This allowed him to include more conflicts whose
combat fatalities may have been limited, but whose aggregate impact is unmistakably
violent and disruptive. Regan recorded a total of 151 conflicts under those parameters,
within which he counted 1,036 individual interventions. Some of these variables of
intervention were recorded as dichotomous “yes” or “no” / “1” or “0” value designation,
22

indicating that variable of interest was present or not present under the specified
conditions. Other variables record estimates of the total value of that variable in the
specified conditions.
Regan’s data did not include any information on refugees, however. This data was
collected from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Statistics
Database. The UNHCR Database reports data pertaining to country-year recordings of
refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced peoples, and stateless peoples. This data
was merged with Regan’s and recorded as the variable “refugee flow.” This variable
includes estimates on country-year values of refugees or individuals in refugee-like
conditions as reported by the UNHCR.
Hypothesis 1 is directional and positive; I anticipate a change in the level of
refugees in cases where direct and indirect military support is present. Hypothesis 2
suggests that there will be no change in the flow of refugees when tested against
humanitarian aid. My independent variable (IV) is external support, while refugee flow
will serve as the dependent variable (DV). I will not be testing just one broadly defined
variable called “external support.” Instead, this larger IV will be tested in multiple
categories: direct military support, indirect military support, and humanitarian aid.
I operationalize direct military support in two ways. First, I use a combined
measure which includes three variables in Regan’s data: “troops,” “navy,” and “airforce.”
These variable names refer to the form of military intervention. This combined measure
is tested in a multiple regression model against the variable “refugee flow.” Second, I
disaggregate this measure by breaking it into its constituent variables and test them
individually.
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Indirect military support is operationalized in a similar way. I first use a combined
measure which includes the variables “equip” and “intel.” “Equip” refers to any military
equipment or aid supplied during the conflict, and “intel” refers to any form of
intelligence or reconnaissance delivered to combatants. It too is first tested as a combined
measure in a multiple regression model, and then broken into its constituent variables and
tested individually.
Humanitarian aid will be designated by the variables “aid” (includes all nonmilitary aid delivered to actors within a particular conflict), “grant” (any funds given
freely without interest during the conflict), “loan” (funds loaned during the conflict),
“credit,” and “relief” (relief of past financial obligations). Like the previous two
categories, humanitarian aid will be tested as a combined measure, and then
disaggregated and tested at the individual variable level.
For control variables (CV), I am including Regan’s measures of “sizeopp” (size of
opposition forces), “coldwar” (indicates if a conflict was part of the Cold War), and “fatal”
(estimate of the total fatalities in a conflict). These CV’s should account for any changes
in the DV across IV tests. These variables will be tested against my DV, “refugee flow”
(measurement of refugees or individuals forced into refugee-like situations)

Results
Humanitarian Aid
I ran three separate multiple regression models to test each category of variables
for external support. The first category was humanitarian aid, which was comprised of
the variables “aid,” “grant,” “loan,” “credit,” and “relief.” The summary statistics for this
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regression test can be found under “Model 2” in Table 1 below. Humanitarian aid had a
coefficient estimate of 3.373e+04 and a standard error of 8.344e+04. Its p-value of
0.6860 and t-value of 0.404 indicate very little statistical significance with the DV,
suggesting that the correlation between humanitarian aid as it is broadly defined and
refugee flow is low. A correlation test between the two variables produces a value of
0.00676, well within the range denoting a weak relationship (-0.2 < x < 0.2). There is still
a lack of statistical significance at the constituent variable level as well. “Aid” had a tvalue of -0.655 and a p-value of 0.5128 to go along with a coefficient estimate of 2.416e+05 as shown in “Model 1.” This variable was the closest of set in exhibiting any
statistical significance in relation to “refugee flow,” but even it still falls short of the
acceptable range.
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There are several ways to interpret these results. The first, and most obvious,
interpretation is that humanitarian aid as it is broadly defined in this test has little to no
direct impact on refugee flow. Its positive coefficient estimate contradicts the
hypothesized relationship between humanitarian aid and refugee flow; namely, that the
presence of humanitarian aid in a conflict would at the very least have no impact on
refugee flow. Since this coefficient is not statistically significant, however, it is safe to
assume that humanitarian aid has little to no impact on the flow of refugees during a
conflict.
Another way to interpret these results is at the constituent variable-level. Of the
five constituent variables for humanitarian aid, only “aid” and “credit” had negative
coefficients. Although none of the tested variables displayed any statistical significance,
it is interesting to note that only some of the variables for humanitarian aid could be
associated with decreased levels of refugee flow. While the negative coefficient for “aid”
can be normatively explained, it is harder to understand why “credit” but not “loan,”
“grant,” or “relief” had a negative association with refugee flow. I would blame it on lack
of information. Regan’s data has a very small sample size for economic interventions,
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confirming “credit” interventions in only three conflict-month cases out of 12,240.
Similarly, “aid” only had four confirmed cases while “loan” had seven. “Grant” had the
highest amount of confirmed interventions at 78. These coefficients can also be
normatively explained, to some degree. Loans, grants, credit, and debt relief tend to have
less material impact on a humanitarian crisis, especially in a war. Those economic
reprieves even allow for greater military expenditure, even if they were delivered with
humanitarian intent. Aid in the form of non-military equipment, however, is more
enabling in the sense of supporting and/or preventing refugees. This theme of variables
and their enabling effects will present itself in the cases of direct and indirect military
support as well. Regardless, these results still satisfy Hypothesis 2, that humanitarian aid
would have little to no impact on refugee flow. As discussed previously, humanitarian aid
can increase incentives for violence in some cases (Wood & Sullivan, 2015). Aid
delivered to government agencies presents a challenge to rebel groups, who have a harder
time generating civilian support and maintaining authority when they lack total control of
resources. This phenomenon mitigates any net decreases in refugee flow caused by aid.
Indirect Military Support
The second category that was tested was indirect military support, which was
comprised of the variables “equip” and “intel.” The summary statistics for this regression
test can be found under “Model 4” in Table 2 below. Indirect military support had a
coefficient estimate of 8.947e+04 and a standard error of 6.546e+04. There is some slight
statistical significance when compared to humanitarian aid, as “indirect” had a t-value of
1.367 and a p-value of 0.1718. These values still fall short of the acceptable range. The
correlation value between “indirect” and “refugee flow” is 0.00428, which is within the
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range denoting a weak relationship. There is some statistical significance at the
constituent variable level, however. “Equip” has a t-value of 2.473 and a p-value of
0.0134. This puts it in the acceptable range of statistical significance, suggesting that
there is linear relationship between “equip” and “refugee flow.” “Intel” tested well-short
of the acceptable range for significance, and its negative coefficient estimate goes against
the expected outcome outlined in the hypothesis.

Like humanitarian aid, there are several ways to interpret these results. From a
broader categorical perspective, indirect military support has little impact on refugee flow.
“Indirect” had a high and positive coefficient estimate, suggesting that the presence of
indirect military support in a conflict corresponds to a high unit increase in refugees. As it
is not statistically significant to a satisfying degree, however, this conclusion is too hasty.
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These results can also be interpreted at the constituent variable-level. “Equip” not
only had a high and positive coefficient estimate, but it exhibited statistical significance
as indicated by its t-value and p-value. These results suggest that the presence of military
equipment or aid is correlated with higher levels of refugees. Like “aid” in the
humanitarian aid category, this is likely due to the enabling effects of equipment. Rather
than enabling the prevention or mitigation of refugee flow, however, military equipment
and aid enables more violence against civilians. Rebel organizations without a steady
supply of arms and equipment pose less of a threat to both the government and the
civilian population. Without weapons, rebels intrinsically less likely to commit acts of
violence against civilians. The supplying or small arms and other small-scale equipment
lends a rebel organization few options in terms of combating government forces. They
are often only left with the option of using guerilla tactics and using the civilian
population to blend in. This leads to more paranoia amongst government forces, who will
often target civilians in order to flush out any rebels hiding amongst them (Kalyvas,
2006). This could also explain why “intel” did not display any statistical significance. In
fact, the variable for intelligence interventions had a negative coefficient estimate.
Intelligence is far less enabling in terms of violence against civilians. Intelligence
delivered from a third party during a civil war is only useful for actions against
combatants. It is improbable that intelligence on combatant forces would lead to civilian
victimization and violence. Overall, the values associated with indirect military support
as a whole do not satisfy Hypothesis 1, but the constituent variable “equip” does.

Direct Military Support
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The last category that was tested was direct military support, which was
comprised of the variables “troops,” “navy,” and “airforce.” The summary statistics for
this category can be found in “Model 6” of Table 3. “Military,” the broader variable
indicating the presence of direct military support, had a coefficient estimate of 7.172e+05
and a standard error of 1.461e+04. Its t-value of 0.663 and p-value of 0.5071 indicate
little to no statistical significance, and “military” fails to satisfy the conditions of
Hypothesis 1 as a broader category of variables. There is some statistical significance at
the constituent variable level, though. The coefficient estimate for “troops” is rather high
at 9.092e+04, and its t-value of 2.271 and p-value of 0.0232 indicate statistical
significance. This means that interventions or support in the form of troops is correlated
with a higher level of refugees during a civil war. The same cannot be said for the
constituent variables “navy” and “airforce.” Both coefficient estimates were negative,
implying the opposite outcome predicted in Hypothesis 1 in terms of direct military
support’s effect on refugee flow. Additionally, their t-values and p-values do not indicate
statistical significance, suggesting that effects of air and naval interventions on refugee
flow in a civil war are irrelevant.
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There are several ways to interpret these results. From a broader categorical
perspective, direct military support did not satisfy the conditions described in Hypothesis
1. This does not mean it is completely irrelevant in the context of refugee flow. “Model 5”
shows how each of the constituent variables relates to refugee flow. As previously
mentioned, the “troops” variable satisfies the conditions of Hypothesis 1 while “navy”
and “airforce” did not. Empirically, this makes sense. The intervention and presence of
troops in a civil war is much more conducive to civilian victimization than strategic air
and naval strikes. Troops are harder to control than strategic strikes, and this inherently
means that incidents of violence perpetrated against civilians are more likely when troops
are deployed in a conflict. There is also the visible factor to consider: troops on the
ground present a visible threat to non-combatants. Unlike air and naval strikes, troops can
be seen, heard, and most importantly, avoided. Civilians fearing persecution and violence
have the opportunity to flee from troops in a conflict zone since troops present a clear and
avoidable danger (Kalyvas, 2006). This option does not exist for air and naval strikes,
which can occur anywhere at any time and are generally less of a direct threat that
civilians can avoid.
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This idea of visible danger and violence is similar to the idea of “enabling” as
discussed in indirect military support and humanitarian aid. Just like non-military
equipment can enable the prevention of refugees and military equipment can enable
violence against civilians (thus creating refugees), troops on the ground is more enabling
and conducive to civilian victimization and fear. This fear, whether warranted or not,
leads people to flee their communities and become refugees. What all three variables
have in common is their physical presence in a conflict and their visibility to the civilian
population. Noncombatants can see troops. They can see weapons and equipment in the
hands of troops. They can see medical equipment and aid in the hands of humanitarian
workers. Perceptions seem to matter in the context of violence and fear, and these
perceptions can influence individuals to become refugees or not.

Conclusion
The goal of this research was to determine the relationship between external
support within the context of a civil war and its effects on refugee flow. External support
was defined and categorized three ways: humanitarian aid, indirect military support, and
direct military support. These categories of support were comprised of multiple variables
and tested using multiple regression models to determine their relationship to countryyear measurements of refugees. Overall, the categorical tests for direct and indirect
military support did not satisfy the conditions of Hypothesis 1, wherein both forms of
support would correlate with a higher level of refugee flow. Humanitarian aid, however,
did satisfy the conditions of Hypothesis 2, wherein humanitarian aid would have little to
no relationship with refugee flow and at the very least would show a slight decrease.
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The constituent variable tests were far more telling than the categorical
observations. Humanitarian aid displayed little to no relationship with refugee flow
across all of its variables, confirming Hypothesis 2 at the constituent variable level, as
well. For indirect military support, the variable for military equipment and aid showed a
positive relationship with refugee flow, indicating that the presence of military equipment
and aid can lead to more refugees. This was also true for the variable indicating troop
presence in the direct military support test. The presence of troops in a civil war is
correlated with higher levels of refugees, while air and naval strikes are not. All of these
observations emphasize the idea of noncombatant perceptions influencing refugee flow.
Troops, aid, and equipment are all tangible things that can influence the fear levels of a
civilian population. Troops and equipment can lead to increased fear and violence, while
aid can influence civilians to remain in the country. Air and naval strikes, intelligence,
and economic loans/credit/grants/relief are far too intangible to have any impacts on the
fear perceptions of civilians.
This poses an interesting predicament for countries proximate to a civil war or
with international interests at stake. The Syrian Refugee Crisis in the mid 2010’s led
many countries to reevaluate their intervention strategies in wars outside of their own
country. If the price of intervention was increased refugees in the international world,
was intervention worth it? What strategies afforded countries a way to intervene in a
conflict without the risk of increased refugees? According to these tests measuring the
relationship between various intervention strategies and refugee flow, policy makers may
want to pursue less perceptible means of direct and indirect military support, such as
naval/air strikes and intelligence lending. Additionally, they may be more effective in
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limiting refugee flow in choosing to deliver non-military aid and equipment rather than
economic grans/loans/relief.
This research presents an interesting question regarding the influence of civilian
perceptions on refugee flow. Do certain acts of violence create more refugees than others?
Additionally, there are also questions regarding the effectiveness of humanitarian
equipment and aid. Do certain strategies of aid distribution limit refugee flow more than
others? What is the most effective way of distributing humanitarian aid and equipment?
These are all questions future researchers may choose to focus on going forward.
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